June 21, 1993 Subject: Uniform Duties to Disabled Persons Act From: ZIPPY%BKLYN.BITNET@uunet.uu.net (Tzipporah BenAvraham) [Forwarded by Patt Bromberger] My special thanks to the Epilepsy Society of America, Ms Cynthia Lehman, Legal Counsel for this document. She can be reached at 4351 Garden City Drive, Landover MD 20785 1 301 459 3700. This document was scanned into ascii by Tzipporah Benavraham for electronic dissemnination. UNIFORM DUTIES TO DISABLED PERSONS ACT Drafted by the NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS and by it Approved and recommended for enactment in all the states at its ANNUAL CONFERENCE MEETING IN ITS EIGHTY FIRST YEAR AT SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA AUGUST 4-11, 1972 With Prefatory Note The Committee which acted for the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in preparing the Uniform Duties to Disabled Persons Act as follows: Robinson O. Everett, P.O. Box 586, Durham, N.C. 27701, Chairman Thomas L. Jones,, P.O. Box 5557, University, Ala. 35486 Myron W. Kronisch, 17 Academy St., Newark, N.J., 07102 E. Wayne Thode, University of Utah School of Law, Salt Lake City, Utah 84112 Don J. McClenahan, 312 Simplot Bldg., Boise, Idaho 83702, Chairman of Division E,Ex Officio ______________________ Copies of all Uniform and Model Acts and other printed matter issued by the Conference may be obtained from National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws 1155 East Sixtieth Street Chicago, Illinois 60637 UNIFORM DUTIES TO DISABLED PERSONS ACT Prefatory Note The purpose of this statute is to provide, insofar as practicable, for a minimum level of duty toward persons in an unconscious state (whether such state is caused by a chronic condition or whether it is the result of an injury, such as one inflicted in a traffic accident) and toward those who are conscious but otherwise unable to communicate the existence of a condition requiring special treatment. These groups of persons are here collectively referred to as disabled persons. Duties are prescribed for three categories of persons who may come into contact with a disabled person: law enforcement officers, medical personnel, and all others. While stricter duties are imposed on the first two categories because of their special expertise in protecting the public, some degree of duty is still imposed under Section 5 upon all other persons in the hope of stimulating state- and locally- sponsored educational programs in this area. In 1963 the Georgia legislature enacted the initial statute dealing with this problem. That statute had three sections, the last of which (dealing with misrepresentation) is the basis for the unbracketed portion of this statute's section 6. The remainder of the Georgia statute provides for the wearing of identification devices and the duty of law enforcement officers in the following terms: 79-602. Identifying bracelets, tags or cards for persons with certain afflictions. Any person who suffers from epilepsy, diabetes, a cardiac condition, or any other type of illness which causes temporary blackouts, semiconscious periods, or complete unconsciousness, is hereby authorized to wear an identification bracelet or metal tag or carry an identification card with the person's name , type of illness, physician's name, and medication required, engraved, stamped, or imprinted thereon. 79-603. Same; duty of law enforcement officers with respect to such persons. It shall be the duty of all law enforcement officers in this State to make s diligent effort to determine if any person they may find in a semiconscious or unconscious condition is an epileptic or diabetic or a person who is suffering from any other type of illness which would cause semiconsciousness or uncon- sciousness, before such person may be charged with a crime. If any law enforcement officer shall determine that such a person is actually suffering from an affliction which would cause semicon- sciousness or unconsciousness, it shall be his duty to notify such person's physician immediately or have such person immediately transported to a physical or to some facility where the services of a physician are available. ( The Pennsylvania statute adopted in 1970 follows closely the Georgia law.) See Code Ga Ann 79-602, 79-603, 79-9902 (Supp. 1970); Pa. Stat. Ann. 10011-13 (Supp. 1971). Arkansas provides for state sale of identification devices, but imposes no duty upon any group with regard to wearers of such device. See Ark. Stat. Ann 82-131 (Supp. 1969). No other state has passed legislation more compre- hensive than the Georgia (Pennsylvania) or Arkansas statutes. Some omissions of the Georgia legislation which the Uniform Act seeks to remedy are: (1) its failure to standardize the identification device; (2) its failure to cover other medical conditions that do not cause periods of unconsciousness, but knowledge of which would be essential in emergency; (3) its failure to impose any duty upon medical personnel; and (4) its failure to protect law enforcement officers, medical personnel, and others from actions for larceny, invasion of privacy, or unauthorized search if they attempt to find identification cards in a disabled person's clothing or other personal effects. As written, the existing statutes are arguably directed at and confined in their usefulness to epileptics, diabetics, or persons with heart conditions who might be arrested and charged with drunkenness when in actuality they are having a seizure or are in a coma. Not only would such an arrest be unwarranted, inflicting unnecessary indignity upon innocent persons, but in many cases the time spent being arrested and charged may be time in which necessary medical treatment may be denied. Thus, the diabetic who needs insulin may die in jail because he was believed drunk. However, persons with these conditions are not the only persons who may become disabled or unconscious. For example, victims of automobile accidents, persons suffering from an overdose of various addictive drugs, and alcoholics may be in circumstances where particular emergency care is warranted. The dangers inherent in each of these representative situations are obvious. (a) While the victim of an accident, if sufficiently maimed, the most likely will be taken to a medical facility rather than arrested, victims who are not visibly injured but who are sufficiently dazed run the risk of being incarcerated rather than treated (this may be particularly dangerous for the victim of a hit and run incident rather than a victim who is actually inside or near an automobile when found by law enforcement officers). Even those persons who are so visibly injured that they are immediately treated for their injuries may nonetheless need further protection. If, for example, they suffer from conditions unrelated to their injury, but are unconscious or too incoherent to communicate this information, they may suffer irreparable injury from failure to receive a needed drug (e.g., insulin) or from receiving a drug which they are sensitive (e.g., penicillin), (b) Likewise drug addicts (or even casual users) and alcoholics are unlikely to advertise these conditions for fear of punitive consequences. Thus they are unlikely to wear identification devices even though subject to blackouts or periods of semicon- sciousness or total unconsciousness (because of their addiction or other condition). Again existing statutes do not provide a satis- factory method for dealing with persons in these categories. In a jurisdiction where alcoholism or drug addiction is considered an illness and not a crime, there may be specialized facilities where these people are taken and treated for their addiction. However, if they are also suffering from another condition needing treatment, either immediate or at intervals, the very recognition of addiction, whether by identification device or by observation, may result in law enforcement officers and the personnel in a receiving institution overlooking the second condition. Yet, failure to detect a second condition, be it heart disease or tetanus, may result in irreparable injury to the addicted person. (c) Moreover, in jurisdictions where addiction is a crime not only may the secondary conditions discussed above be overlooked but the dosage taken may itself cause death during the period of arrest and confinement. If the existence of overdosing were recognized and medical treatment would have prevented death or other injury, then limiting hospitalization to illness can easily result in unnecessary injury. Including persons requiring specific medication, having allergies to certain treatments, or unable to communicate coherently even though not unconscious, narrows the gap in the coverage of existing acts through a more realistic definition of what constitutes a disabled person. Likewise, the procedure denominated as duties in the statute proposed here are more extensive, specific, and positive than in prior statutes. It is believed these characteristics are necessary if the statute is to provide meaningful duties toward disabled persons. Two types of provisions are essential to the existence of such duties: there must be positive duties set forth, and there must be immunity from prosecution accorded those who undertake these duties in good faith. The Act does not attempt to prescribe tort or criminal liabilities for failure to person these duties; but may arise under other laws of a State. The duties set forth in this statute can be divided into two groups: those associated with the existence of a tag or bracelet bearing the emergency symbol and those imposed in all events. In addition various groups of persons- law enforcement officers, medical personnel, and others- are not held to uniform performance of all these duties. If an identification device is worn by the disabled person, all groups are given the duty, express or implied, of examining such devise for any emergency information it may yield. (a) Law enforcement officers would be derelict in their duty for failing to read these devices. In addition, they would be derelict for failing to search for an identification card, since the wearing of a tag or bracelet indicates the disabled person is carrying such a card. However, this latter duty is deemed discharged if the officer has reason to believe the person's condition would be worsened by the movement involved in a search of his clothing. To protect the disabled person in the latter situation, the officer is placed under a duty to summon medical assistance for the person immediately. (b) If the person is not in such a condition that the officer feels a search would be dangerous, then, if feasible, the search must be made before the officer can take the person into custody or move him from the place he is found. This provision is designated to protect the disabled person, since a search may reveal a condition in need of immediate treatment. If such a condition is revealed, the officer is placed under a duty to seek immediate medical assistance or to transport to a physician or medical facility, depending on whether the person's condition is such that he can be safely moved buy nonmedical personnel. While a "reasonable officer" standard could govern this interpretation, it is expected that radio communication to medical personnel will be utilized by such officers before they move disabled persons. (c) Medical personnel would not be considered derelict in their duty for failing to search for an identification card so long as they do in fact detect any condition such card indicates as needing treatment in time to render timely treatment (or to suspend treatment in cases of sensitivity). The purpose of this statute is to help establish a standard of care toward disabled persons; it does not attempt to prescribe the means by which medical personnel should practice medicine. Thus such personnel may be considered derelict in not searching if their own methodology fails to detect a condition described on a identification card carried by a disabled person, even though routine medical testing would not have uncovered such condition; but they are not to be considered derelict in such cases if the condition was not described on the card. Nor are they to be considered derelict if they discover the condition without searching for the card. (d) The duty prescribed under bracketed Section 5 for all other persons is limited to determining if an identification tag or bracelet is worn and to notifying law enforcement officers. No duty to search for an identification tag is imposed because of the inadvisability of leaving to nontrained personnel the decision whether such a search might be injurious. Further, no exceptions are made to impose duties upon medical personnel finding disabled persons, since various state "Good Samaritan" laws cover the obligations imposed in this instance, and it is beyond the scope of this statute to attempt to unify such provisions. Aside from specifying duties, this statute offers protection for those persons who do carry out the statutory mandate. It has been indicated that law enforcement personnel are deterred from searching for identification cards, because they might be held liable for invasion of privacy, illegal search, or larceny. The statute deals with this problem in two ways. First, any person wearing an identification tag or bracelet is deemed to give his consent to search by law enforcement officers or medical personnel looking for an identification card. This will prevent any action for above offenses if a bona fide search is made but will not extinguish an action if the search is made for other purposes. Second, law enforcement officers and medical personnel are further exempted from such actions even if a tag or bracelet is not worn. The statute also provides for standard identification devices-bracelets and tags stamped with the AMA-designed emergency symbol. The desire for a uniform device can be attributed to the mobility of the United States' population and the concomitant need to assure travelers of a common standard of care. In addition, the tags and bracelets were chosen because they can usually be found without moving the disabled person extensively. They do, however, have the possible drawback of being lost or stolen if the person has become disabled through a violent accident or theft, and thus a more durable indicator may be desired. In the case of theft, at least, an identification card may be stolen and thus would be no more effective. In all other instances, it is felt that the dangers inherent in search are greater than the dangers of losing the tag or bracelet. Indeed the most effective method of preserving such information, the tattoo, is the method least likely to serve the purposes of this statute. First, finding the tattoo, even in a designated part of the anatomy, could involve dangerous movement. Second, many persons who might not object to wearing an identification device could be expected to balk at the idea of a tattoo, whether for religious, aesthetic, or other reasons. In addition, such tattoos may turn out to be unreadable, thus defeating the original purpose. For all these reasons, identification tags and bracelets have been chosen as the primary devices to signal the existence of emergency information. Section 2 includes a provision that religious objection to medical treatment may be noted. While it is questionable whether physicians can be bound by such restrictions (and the statute imposes no penalty for disregarding them), the provision may be of aid where alternative treatments can be given. Moreover, this phrase is bracketed to indicate it is an optional part of the statute. Various suggestions were made which could not be incorporated into this statute. These included public education programs, police education programs, and adoption of a standard identi- fication card. While all of these suggestions would enhance the effectiveness of this statute, there are strong reasons for not including them herein. (a) Education, whether of police or public, is a local function best designed to meet local conditions. A uniform program may be too broad for some areas, too narrow for others. In addition, many states may already have education programs covering the information contemplated. It is felt, however, that this Act may be sufficient to stimulate any needed state education efforts. (b) Identification cards are another field where uniform legislation may be desirable, but in view of the limited classes authorized to search for such cards, there seems less reason to prescribe a preferred form here than for the tags and bracelets themselves. Individuals are thus left free to use the form of card best suited to the information they have to convey. This may be comprehensive AMA-approved card, a driver's license [see, e.g., Mich Comp Laws Ann 257.310(e) (Supp. 1971)], or any other identification card. Should a state wish to adopt a standard card as part of this statute, it can easily do so. While the Act does not provide a standard place, e.g.,neck, arm, leg, for wearing an identification device, educational programs may seek to develop uniformity in this regard. (c) A suggestion, dealing with the treatment of public intoxication, was too broad to incorporate in this statute. It is felt that the decision to treat that condition as a crime, sickness, or in some third category is beyond the scope and purpose of these provisions. This statute does aim to provide some assistance for intoxicated persons suffering from disabling conditions (as that term is used in the statute), and this assistance is not conditioned upon the treatment otherwise accorded such intoxication by any given State. "Law Enforcement officer" is bracketed since the enacting State may wish to use some other term, such as "peace officer" or "police officer" more in conformity with its other statutes. Also, the Act leaves to the general law of the enacting State the status of the off-duty policeman, whether he has only the duties and immunities of a member of the general public or has the duties and immunities that he possesses while on duty. A State enacting bracketed Section 5 may wish to amend Section 2(c) to provide that the consent granted by wearing an identifying device includes consent to search for an identification card when a policeman or doctor is not present. UNIFORM DUTIES TO DISABLED PERSONS ACT An Act to provide for the use of identifying devices to provide for duty owed disabled persons. [Be it enacted...] 1 Section 1. [Definitions] In this Act: 2 (1) "disabled condition means the condition of being uncon- 3 scious, semiconscious, incoherent, or otherwise incapacitated to 4 communicate: 5 (2) "disabled person" means a person in a disabled condition; 6 (3) "the emergency symbol" means the caduceus inscribed 7 within a six-barred cross used by the American Medical Associa- 8 tion to denote emergency information; 9 (4) "identifying device" means an identifying bracelet, neck- 10 lace, metal tag, or similar device bearing the emergency symbol 11 and the information needed in an emergency; 12 (5)"medical practitioner" means a person licensed or author- 13 ized to practice medicine [osteopathy and healing arts], 1 Section 2. [Identifying Devices for Persons Having Certain Con- 2 ditions.] 3 (a) A person who suffers from epilepsy, diabetes, a cardiac con- 4 dition, or any other type of illness that causes temporary blackouts, 5 semiconscious periods, or complete unconsciousness, or who suffers 6 from a condition requiring specific medication or medical treatment, 7 is allergic to certain medications or items used in medical treatment, 8 wears contact lenses, [has religious objections to certain forms of 9 medication or medical treatment], or is unable to communicate co- 10 herently or effectively in the English language, is authorized and 11 encouraged to wear an identifying device. 12 (b) Any person may carry an identification card bearing his 13 name, type of medical condition, physician's name, and other medi- 14 cal information. 15 (c) By wearing an identifying device a person gives his consent 16 for any [law enforcement officer] or medical practitioner who finds 17 him in a disabled condition to make a reasonable search of his 18 clothing or other effects for an identification card of the type de- 19 scribed in subsection (b). 1 Section 3. [Duty of [Law Enforcement Officer].] 2 (a) A [law enforcement officer] shall make a diligent effort to 3 determine whether any disabled person he finds in an epileptic or a 4 diabetic, or suffers from some other type of illness that would cause 5 the condition. Whenever feasible, this effort shall be made before 6 the person is charged with a crime or taken to a place of detention. 7 (b) In seeking to determine whether a disabled person suffers 8 from an illness, a [law enforcement officer] shall make a reasonable 9 search for an identifying device and an identification card of the 10 type described in Section 2 (b) and examine them for emergency 11 information. The [law enforcement officer] may not search for an 12 identifying device or an identification card in a manner or to an 13 extent that would appear to a reasonable person in the circumstances 14 to cause an unreasonable risk of worsening the disabled person's 15 condition. 16 (c) A [law enforcement officer] who finds a disabled person 17 without an identifying device or identification card is not relieved 18 from his duty to that person to make diligent effort to ascertain the 19 existence of any illness causing the disabled condition. 20 (d) A [claim for relief] [cause of action] against a [law enforce- 21 ment officer] does not arise from his making a responsible search of 22 the disabled person to locate an identifying device or identification 23 card, even though the person is not wearing an identifying device 24 or carrying an identification card. 25 (e) A [law enforcement officer] who determines or has reason to 26 believe that a disabled person is suffering from an illness causing his 27 condition shall promptly notify the person's physician, if practicable. 28 If the officer is unable to ascertain the physician's identity or com- 29 municate with him, the officer shall make a reasonable effort to cause 30 the disabled person to be transported immediately to a medical 31 practitioner or to a facility where medical treatment is available. 32 If the officer believes it unduly dangerous to move the disabled per 33 son, he shall make a reasonable effort to obtain the assistance of a 34 medical practitioner. 1 Section 4. [Duty of Medical Practitioners.] 2 (a) A medical practitioner, in discharging his duty to a disabled 3 person whom he has undertaken to examine or treat, shall make a 4 reasonable search for an identifying device or identification card of 5 the type described in Section 2 (b) and examine them for emergency 6 information. 7 (b) A [claim for relief] [cause of action] against a medical prac- 8 titioner does not arise from his making a reasonable search of a 9 disabled person to locate an identifying device or identification 10 card, even though the person is not wearing an identifying device 11 or carrying an identification card. 1 Section 5. [Duty of Others.] 2 (a) A person, other than a [law enforcement officer] or medical 3 practitioner, who finds a disabled person shall make a reasonable 4 effort to notify a [law enforcement officer]. If a [law enforcement 5 officer] or medical practitioner is not present, a person who finds a 6 disabled person may (1) make a reasonable search for an identify- 7 ing device, and (2) if the identifying device is found may make a 8 reasonable search for an identification card of the type described 9 in Section 2 (b). If a device or card is located, the person making 10 search shall attempt promptly to bring its contents to the attention 11 of a [law enforcement officer] or medical practitioner. 12 (b) A [claim for relief] [cause of action] does not arise from a 13 reasonable search to locate an identifying device or identification 14 card as authorized by subsection (a). 1 Section 6. [Falsifying Identification or Misrepresenting Condi- 2 tion.] A person who with intent to deceive provides, wears, uses, or 3 possesses a false identifying device or identification card of the type 4 described in Section 2 (b) is guilty of a [misdemeanor] [and upon 5 conviction may be fined not more than [$300] or imprisoned for not 6 more than [90 days], or both]. 1 Section 7. [Other Duties.] The duties imposed by this Act are 2 in addition to, and not in limitation of, other duties existing under 3 the law of this State. 1 Section 8. [Uniformity of Application and Construction.] This 2 Act shall be so applied and construed as to effectuate its general 3 purpose to make uniform the law with respect to the subject of this 4 Act among those stated which enact it. 1 Section 9. [Severability.] If any provision of this Act or the appli- 2 cation thereof to any person or circumstances is held invalid, the in 3 validity does not affect other provisions or applications of the Act 4 which can be given effect without the invalid provision or application, 5 and to this end the provisions of this Act are severable. 1 Section 10. [Short Title.] This Act may be cited as the "Uniform 2 Duties to Disabled Persons Act." 1 Section 11. [Repeal.] [The following acts and parts of acts are 2 repealed: 3 (1) 4 (2) 5 (3) .] 1 Section 12. [Time of Taking Effect.] This Act shall take effect...